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Will the Ebola Epidemic Serve To Make
Reform of the Broken Health Research and
Development Framework Go Viral?
JEREMY MCDONALD*
ABSTRACT
The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa has captured the public
imagination as few other epidemics have, as its rapid spread and lethal
effect demonstrated the devastating toll that infectious diseases can exact
from a world unprepared to confront them. In light of the epidemic's
tragic consequences, numerous experts have called for reform of the
system of global health governance whose shortfalls allowed the epidemic
to assume the horrifying dimensions it did. Among the many
inadequacies that the outbreak uncovered is the insufficient amount of
research into and development of treatments and vaccines for infectious
diseases of poverty, among them the so-called "neglected tropical
diseases." This lack of vital research and development long predated the
present Ebola outbreak, and, given how widespread calls of reform have
been since the epidemic, it bears assessing whether the crisis will provide
the impetus necessary for meaningful change to the calcified research
and development framework that has long ignored Ebola and like
ailments. Due to a variety of factors that this Note seeks to explain,
however, this will likely not be the case.
INTRODUCTION
The West African Ebola epidemic that began in 2013 and ravaged
the nations of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea appears to be on the
wane. Although isolated flare-ups of the disease have followed on the
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heels of World Health Organization (WHO) pronouncements of the
outbreak's cessation, Ebola incidence has fallen drastically since its
peak period from September 2014 to May 2015, when hundreds of new
cases were being reported weekly.' Additionally, the clinical trials for
three potential Ebola vaccines conducted at record speed amidst the
outbreak have had encouraging results: one vaccine candidate,
pharmaceutical giant Merck's rVSV-ZEBOV, prevented infections in 100
percent of the patients to whom it was administered, 2 allowing for hope
that any potential for future outbreaks will be severely diminished.
Given that there have been more than twenty Ebola outbreaks
before the current one 3 and that the virus was first discovered in 1976, 4
however, it may seem puzzling that these trials were necessary at all, or
in other words, that there was no approved treatment or vaccine for
Ebola at the time the most recent epidemic began. But in this respect,
Ebola is illustrative of a sadly persistent theme in the annals of global
health: the general dearth of research into and development of
treatments and vaccines for infectious diseases that are largely endemic
to impoverished populations in developing states, collectively referred to
as "neglected tropical diseases" (NTDs).5 The term "neglected" is apt:
1. See 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa - Reported Cases Graphs, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, graph 1, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-
west-africalcumulative-cases-graphs.html (last updated Jan. 17, 2016).
2. See Ana Maria Henao-Restrepo et al., Efficacy and Effectiveness of an rVSV-
Vectored Vaccine Expressing Ebola Surface Glycoprotein: Interim Results from the Guinea
Ring Vaccination Cluster-Randomised Trial, 386 LANCET 857, 857 (2015).
3. Sarah Roache et al., Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic: Towards a
Legacy of Strong Health Systems, O'NEILL INST. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 2, 2014, at 11.
4. See DAVID QUAMMEN, EBOLA: THE NATURAL AND HUMAN HISTORY OF A DEADLY
VIRUS 14 (2014).
5. See Neglected Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO],
http://www.who.int/neglecteddiseases/diseases/en/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2015)
[hereinafter NTDs] (providing a detailed summary of each type of NTD). The WHO does
not classify Ebola as an NTD. See id. (listing WHO-classified NTDs). However, Ebola
shares many similarities with these illnesses, namely its infectious nature, the
demographic of its victims, and the locations where it is endemic. As such, the current
Ebola outbreak provides a useful case study for the purposes of this Note's analysis of
whether the current R&D paradigm, which has so far largely ignored infectious diseases
such as NTDs and Ebola, is likely to change in response to the epidemic. Additionally,
NTDs are not an exhaustive list of all infectious diseases that more heavily burden
developing nations; others, such as malaria, also claim a vast number of victims and yet
are the objects of an insufficient amount of R&D. See REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL
RESISTANCE, SECURING NEW DRUGS FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS: THE PIPELINE OF
ANTIBIOTICS 1 (2015) (noting the decline in antibiotics available for tuberculosis, malaria,
and HIV/AIDS). However, this paper will confine its examination of the R&D prospects for
NTDs in the wake of Ebola, given that they are paid an even more marginal amount of
attention than malaria and other similar ailments.
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although NTDs constitute 12 percent of the global disease burden 6 and
afflict over one billion people worldwide, 7 the resources devoted to their
mitigation are minimal. Only 1 percent of all global health research and
development (R&D) funding is allocated to projects concerning these
illnesses, 8 and of the 850 new therapeutic products registered by
pharmaceutical companies between 2000 and 2011, one percent were for
NTDs. 9
The danger posed by this lack of attention has been poignantly
demonstrated by the latest Ebola epidemic, as its death toll (11,316
people, by the most recent estimates by the WHO) ° dwarfs by far the
death tolls of all previous outbreaks of the disease.1 1 In view of the sheer
extent of the devastation, numerous experts have voiced the sentiment
that the Ebola crisis represents a watershed moment in global health
governance 12 that must be met with sweeping changes. 13 A holistic
appraisal of all the many reform proposals to emerge from the outbreak
6. See Belen Pedrique et al., The Drug and Vaccine Landscape for Neglected Diseases
(2000-2011): A Systematic Assessment, 1 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH 371 (2013).
7. See NTDs, supra note 5.
8. See John-Arne Rottingen et al., Mapping of Available Health Research and
Development Data: What's There, What's Missing, and What Role Is There for a Global
Observatory, 382 LANCET 1286, 1286 (2013).
9. Pedrique et al., supra note 6, at 372 tbl. 1.
10. WHO, EBOLA SITUATION REPORT: 20 JANUARY 2016, fig. 1 (2016), http://apps.who.
int/ebolalcurrent-situation/ebola-situation-report- 2 0-january- 2 016.
11. The second most deadly Ebola outbreak occurred in 1976 and claimed 280 lives. See
Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html (last updated Apr. 14,
2016).
12. The term refers to "the use of formal and informal institutions, rules, and processes
by states, intergovernmental organizations, and nonstate actors to deal with challenges to
health that require cross-border collective action to address effectively." David P. Fidler,
The Challenges of Global Health Governance 3 (May 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/challenges-global-health-governance/p22202.
13. See, e.g., WHO, REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL 8 (2015)
[hereinafter EIAP REPORT], http://www.who.int/entity/csr/resources/publications/ebola/
report-by-panel.pdf ("The Panel firmly believes that [the Ebola crisis] is a defining
moment not only for WHO and the global health emergency response but also for the
governance of the entire global health system."); SUERIE MOON ET AL., WILL EBOLA
CHANGE THE GAME? TEN ESSENTIAL REFORMS BEFORE THE NEXT PANDEMIC. THE REPORT
OF THE HARVARD-LSHTM INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO EBOLA 1-2
(2015) [hereinafter HARvARD-LSHTM REPORT], http://press.thelancet.com/EbolaHPol.pdf
(arguing that the Ebola epidemic "exposed deep inadequacies" in global health governance
and offering ten reforms to lessen the damage of the next pandemic); COMM'N ON A
GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE, THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF
GLOBAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK TO COUNTER INFECTIOUS DISEASE CRISES 1-2 (2016)
[hereinafter NAM REPORT], http://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016l1/Neglected-
Dimension-of-Global-Security.pdf (arguing that the Ebola epidemic demonstrated the need
to invest heavily in measures to mitigate the threat of diseases with pandemic potential).
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is beyond the scope of this Note, however. Instead, it will confine itself
to an examination of whether the epidemic will provide the impetus
necessary for a shift away from the current health R&D paradigm that
has so far largely ignored NTDs-as some have hoped. 14
Part I of this Note provides a brief summary of the many factors
that contributed to Ebola's rapid spread. Part II then provides a short
description of the various proposals that have been offered to stimulate
R&D into NTDs, as well as an analysis of why these proposals have had
little impact to date. Part III examines the R&D-related reform
proposals emerging from the reports issued by a number of expert
panels assessing the response to the Ebola crisis. Lastly, Part IV argues
that despite the tragic effects of the Ebola epidemic, it will likely not
spark any meaningful change to the entrenched health R&D paradigm.
I. THE EBOLA OUTBREAK: ITS ORIGIN AND SPREAD
WHO staff and Guinean health officials have traced the origin of the
current epidemic to December 26, 2013, when an 18-month-old boy from
Meliandou, Guinea developed an illness resulting in the typical
symptoms of Ebola: fever, black stools, and vomiting. 15 The boy died two
days later, yet his disease did not: several members of the boy's family
contracted the Ebola virus, and one of them carried it with him to
Conakry, 16 Guinea's capital and home to more than a seventh of its
population. 17 In this dense urban environment, the disease spread
rapidly. Yet it remained undetected for months, a consequence of the
Guinean government's failure to build its infectious disease surveillance
capabilities, despite the legal obligation to do so placed on it by the
International Health Regulations (IHR).18 Finally, on March 22, 2014,
the Institut Pasteur in Lyon, France confirmed that the viral culprit
14. See MARCO SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., CHATHAM HOUSE, RETHINKING THE GLOBAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 4-5 (2015), https:lwww.chathamhouse.orglsites/files/chathamhouse/
field/fielddocumentl20150923GlobalHealthArchitectureSchaferhoffSuzukiAngelidesHoff
man.pdf (arguing that the Ebola outbreak highlights the need for more development of
"global public goods," one of which is greater levels of research into and development of
treatments for neglected diseases); see generally Manica Balasegaram et al., A Global
Biomedical R&D Rund and Mechanism for Innovations of Public Health Importance, 12
PLOS MED., May 2015, at 1, 3 (arguing that "[tihe devastating loss of human life from the
Ebola outbreak of 2014 must not be in vain" and calling for the establishment of a fund to
subsidize R&D into emerging infectious diseases and neglected diseases).
15. See Origins of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic, WHO (Jan. 2015), http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/ebola/one-year-report/virus-originlenl [hereinafter Origins].
16. See id.
17. See HARvARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
18. See id.
THE EBOLA EPIDEMIC & REFORM OF HEALTH RESEARCH
behind the mounting death toll was Ebola. 19 Two days later, Ebola was
confirmed in Liberia, followed soon after by Sierra Leone in May, 20 a
chain of transmission facilitated by highly mobile populations and
porous borders between the three states. 2
1
The weak investment in public health infrastructures by the
governments of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia not only delayed
detection of Ebola but also resulted in unsafe methods of treatment
inviting further transmission. Health workers toiled without personal
protective equipment or sufficient infection controls, and hundreds of
them contracted the disease and perished as a result.22 Treatment
facilities were unsanitary, overcrowded, and understaffed, leading many
infected individuals to avoid them and further transmit the disease to
their surrounding communities. 23 The atmosphere of panic led to
violence against aid workers and police, 24 and traditional West African
burial rites, many of which called for the ritual touching and bathing of
the bodies of the infected deceased, allowed for further opportunities of
disease transmission. 25 Yet for all this, health officials in the affected
countries downplayed the extent of the disaster for months, for fear of
suffering the economic repercussions that attend the declaration of an
epidemic. 26
19. See Origins, supra note 15.
20. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, A Retrospective and Prospective
Analysis of the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic: Robust National Health
Systems at the Foundation and an Empowered WHO at the Apex, 385 LANCET 1902, 1902
(2015) [hereinafter Empowered WHO].
21. See Factors that Contributed to Undetected Spread of the Ebola Virus and Impeded
Rapid Containment, WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/factors/
en/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
22. See Roache et al., supra note 3, at 3.
23. See id.
24. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20.
25. See Roache et al., supra note 3, at 4.
26. See HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 3. The phenomenon of economic
loss following epidemic declaration is well documented. For instance, after Mexico alerted
the WHO to its HIN1 influenza epidemic in 2009, twenty countries banned the
importation of Mexican pork and pork products, despite a statement by the WHO that the
disease could not be contracted through the consumption of pork. See Rebecca Katz &
Julie Fischer, The Revised International Health Regulations: A Framework for Global
Pandemic Response, 3 GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE, Spring 2010, at 6. Sierra Leone,
Guinea, and Liberia suffered similar repercussions after the presence of Ebola became
known, as numerous states enacted quarantines and travel restrictions to and from Sierra
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. These restrictions severely harmed the affected countries, as
they obstructed trade and the delivery of vital medical services. See Empowered WHO,
supra note 20, at 1903. Moreover, as they were not enacted with scientific justification, see
id. at 1906, they violated the IHR. See WHO, International Health Regulations, art. 43,
para. 2 (2005).
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This reluctance to acknowledge the severity of the situation was
evident even among the foremost institution charged with global health
governance, the WHO. Despite being informed by M~decins Sans
Fronti~res (MSF) aid teams on the ground of the dire threat Ebola
posed, the WHO chose to downplay its extent during the early months of
the epidemic. 27 While MSF characterized the Ebola outbreak as "out of
control" and stressed the need for additional deployment of resources in
late June, 28 the global community declined to take decisive action until
after the medical evacuation of two infected U.S. aid workers from
Liberia in late July.29 In this vacuum, humanitarian groups such as
MSF shouldered the bulk of the burden of caring for the majority of
those stricken by Ebola. 30
On August 8, 2014, months after the outbreak began, the WHO
declared the Ebola outbreak a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) under the IHR,31 a designation reserved
for "extraordinary event[s] which [are] determined . . . to constitute a
public health risk to other States through the international spread of
disease and [that] potentially require a coordinated international
response." 32  Subsequent to this declaration, an unprecedented
outpouring of aid from the global community ensued. Commitments of
financial support and additional health personnel came from the African
Union, China, Cuba, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the
United States, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
United Nations (U.N.) agencies. 33 On September 16, 2014, U.S.
President Obama authorized the deployment of 3,000 U.S. military
personnel to affected sites to support logistics and construct treatment
centers.3 4 Clinical trials for three potential Ebola vaccines rapidly
ensued,35 and practices that had previously contributed to the spread of
the virus, such as unsafe burials and patient avoidance of treatment
27. See HARvARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
28. See id.
29. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20.
30. See Roache et al., supra note 3, at 6.
31. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20.
32. WHO, International Health Regulations, art. 1 (2005).
33. See HARvARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
34. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20.
35. See Tina Rosenberg, Amid Failure and Chaos, an Ebola Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24,
2015), http/opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/after-the-crisi-tools-for-limiting-
ebola/?action=cick&contentCollection=Business%2Day&module=RelatedCoverage&region=
Marginalia&pgtype=article (noting that the time between the commencement of clinical
trials for the vaccine candidates and their use in treatment, "a process that normally takes
years," was "compressed into six months").
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facilities, began to subside as community outreach and education efforts
took hold. 36
This immense outpouring of support has helped to contribute to the
current state of relative containment of the disease. However, its
belated occurrence helped shape the dramatic contours of the trail of
death, illness, and financial ruin Ebola left in its wake. As previously
mentioned, the epidemic claimed thousands more lives than any
previous outbreak of the disease ever had. Survivors of the disease face
a difficult road to recovery, as many of them suffer from a variety of
ailments, including severe joint pains, vision loss, and mental health
issues. 37 Additionally, the economic harm inflicted by the epidemic has
been crippling, as the World Bank has estimated that the total
combined losses to gross domestic product (GDP) suffered by Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Guinea (already three of the weakest economies in
Africa) to be $2.2 billion.38 Taken together, these facts serve as a stark
reminder of the grim toll that infectious diseases can exact from regions
ill prepared to deal with them.
II. PAST PROPOSALS FOR THE STIMULATION OF NTD R&D AND THEIR
EFFECT
The Ebola epidemic dramatically and tragically demonstrated the
need for more research into and development of treatments and
vaccines for infectious diseases of poverty, including NTDs. But
proposals to augment R&D efforts concerning such ailments predate the
outbreak. Below I review some of the most common among them and
assess their impact to date. Additionally, I offer an analysis of why that
impact has remained minimal despite the continuing scourge of NTDs.
A. Past Proposals
The primary factor contributing to the desultory state of NTD R&D
is the lack of commercial value that may be derived from any
36. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20, at 1903.
37. See An Emergency Within An Emergency: Caring for Ebola Survivors, WHO (Aug.
7, 2015), http://www.afro.who.intlen/sierra-leone/press-materials/item/7908-an-emergency-
within-an-emergency-caring-for-ebola-survivors.html.
38. ERROL GRAHAM ET AL., WORLD BANK GROUP, UPDATE ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE 2014-2015 EBOLA EPIDEMIC ON LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA 2 (2015),
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/defaultWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/05/18/
090224b082df93b3/l_0/RenderedPDFUpdate0ontheO0ra0Leone0andGuinea.pdf.
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treatments or vaccines developed for them.39  Pharmaceutical
companies, the most profitable of which are quartered either in the
United States or the European Union, 40 and which possess by far the
greatest part of the world's applied R&D capacity, 41 have little financial
incentive to engage in R&D in the NTD context. Drug development is
quite costly, 42 yet those who stand to benefit most from NTD R&D have
virtually no purchasing power. 43 Recognizing this, experts have for some
time advanced numerous proposals that attempt to assuage the
financial concerns that pharmaceutical companies would otherwise face
in allocating R&D resources to NTDs. Most of these call for the
implementation of policies that would commit government funds to
pharmaceutical companies choosing to undertake NTD R&D. These
proposals can largely be grouped into two categories: first, "push
mechanisms," those that subsidize research inputs, 44 and second, "pull
mechanisms," those that reward research outputs. 45
The theory behind push mechanisms is that providing up-front
financial or technical assistance will lower the reluctance
pharmaceutical companies would otherwise feel about undertaking NTD
R&D. Some of the more common push mechanisms that have been
proposed include direct funding of private research, such as through
39. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on
Global Health: A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH
POLVY L. & ETHICS 1, 28 (2013). The use of the word "primary" is deliberate, as the
perceived unlikelihood of NTD treatments being profitable is not the sole factor behind the
lack of NTD R&D; others, such as the absence of any mechanism to reliably insure patient
access to any resulting treatments, have been posited as well. See PHILIP STEVENS, INT'L
POL'Y NETWORK, DISEASES OF POVERTY AND THE 10/90 GAP 7-8 (2004).
40. See Pharmaceutical Industry, WHO, http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story073/
en/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).
41. See Nathaniel Lipkus, How to Understand Product Development: Public-Private
Partnerships as Vehicles for Innovation in Combating Neglected Disease, 10 MICH. ST. U.
J. MED. & L. 385, 396-97 (2006) (noting the dearth of public institutions capable of
independently undertaking drug R&D); Maxwell R. Morgan, Medicines for the Developing
World: Promoting Access and Innovation in the Post-TRIPS Environment, 64 U. TORONTO
FAc. L. REV. 45, 101 (2006) ("[Pjurely public attempts to develop pharmaceutical products
have generally proved inefficient ... ").
42. Some estimates place the average cost incurred by a pharmaceutical company in
developing a new treatment to be between US $802-1,778 million. Peter Stephens &
H.G.M. Leufkens, Research and Development, in THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION
REPORT 2011, at 1, 2 (3d ed. 2011).
43. See David Webber & Michael Kremer, Perspectives on Stimulating Industrial
Research and Development for Neglected Infectious Diseases, 79 BULL. OF WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 735, 736 (2001).
44. Frank Mueller-Langer, Neglected Infectious Diseases: Are Push and Pull Incentive
Mechanisms Suitable for Promoting Drug Development Research?, 8 HEALTH ECON., POL'Y
& L. 185, 188 (2013).
45. Id. at 191.
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targeted R&D tax credits;46 direct funding of public research, such as
through grants to research universities or institutions; 47 and the use of
product development partnerships (PDP).48 The typical PDP model
consists of a nonprofit organization that partners with a research
institute, university, company, or some mixture of the foregoing,
develops with them a portfolio of medicines to use in the treatment of
NTDs, and provides the partners with funding, technical assistance,
and managerial oversight during each stage of the development of the
product.49
Pull mechanisms, on the other hand, seek to reward research
outputs, thereby coming into play only with successful development of a
new treatment or vaccine. Examples of commonly proposed pull
mechanisms include priority review vouchers, 50  advance market
commitments (AMC),61 and innovation prize schemes. 52 In essence, pull
mechanisms serve as a means of "market shaping"53 whereby a
downstream source of revenue is guaranteed to the developer of a
46. See Webber & Kremer, supra note 44, at 738.
47. See Rutger Daems et al., Advancing Pharmaceutical R&D on Neglected Diseases:
Valuing Push and Pull Economic Incentive Mechanisms 10 (Maastricht Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 2013/11, 2013).
48. See Adrian Towse et al., Drugs and Vaccines for Developing Countries 22 (Univ. of
York, Office of Health Econ. Occasional Paper 11/04, 2011), available at https://faculty.
fuqua.duke.edu/-dbr1/research/developing-Oxford.pdf.
49. See id.
50. See David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 313, 322 (2006). The basic principle is simple: a developer of a drug for an NTD
secures a priority review voucher from a drug regulatory body, such as the FDA. Later, it
redeems that voucher for expedited review of another one of its drugs with potentially
significant commercial value. See Lesley Hamming, The Promise of Priority Review
Vouchers as a Legislative Tool to Encourage Drugs for Neglected Diseases, 11 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 390, 394 (2013).
51. With an AMC, a purchaser--commonly envisioned as one or a group of
international agencies, foundations, or governments-guarantees a pharmaceutical
company that they will purchase at a preset price a given quantity of an NTD treatment
that company develops after the guarantee is made. See Adrian Towse & Hannah Kettler,
Advance Price or Purchase Commitments to Create Markets for Treatments for Diseases of
Poverty: Lessons from Three Policies, 83 BuLL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 301, 301-02 (2005).
52. Proposals for use of the prize scheme generally call for the establishment and
payout of a lump sum by a prize sponsor to developers of an innovative treatment for an
NTD, rather than granting them patent rights for that treatment. See, e.g., James Love &
Tim Hubbard, Comment, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2007). Commentators have also proposed an alternative
prize scheme in which the payout a developer would receive would be scaled in proportion
to the beneficial impact the new drug has. See Shamnad Basheer, Alternative Incentives
for Pharmaceutical Innovation, 27 INTELL. PROP. J. 13, 34 (2014).
53. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 26.
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treatment or vaccine for an NTD, revenue that the beneficiaries of these
products could not themselves provide. 54
Apart from push and pull mechanisms, another, more ambitious
proposal has been offered that would rely on the mechanisms of
international law: the development and ratification of a binding
international agreement on R&D into infectious diseases of poverty.55
This concept has been percolating within the global health community
for some time,56 and just over a year before the beginning of the Ebola
outbreak, the "Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and
Development" established by the WHO recommended the adoption of a
binding R&D treaty under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, 57 which
grants the World Health Assembly the authority to "adopt conventions
or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the
[WHO]."5 The proposed agreement would obligate WHO Member States
to devote a specific portion of their GDPs to R&D meant to meet the
health-related needs of developing countries, either by scaling up
domestic R&D expenditures or committing finances to a pooled
international fund.59
54. In the case of priority review vouchers, the downstream source is speculative
rather than certain, as with the case of AMCs and prize schemes. The perceived benefit
from priority review vouchers is the increased profits a drug developer may reap from
being able market a drug to consumers earlier after redeeming the voucher. Additionally,
the sale of a priority review voucher also provides another potential source of revenue;
some evidence exists to suggest that such vouchers have significant commercial value. See,
e.g., Knight Sells Priority Review Voucher to Gilead, KNIGHT THERAPEUTICS (Nov. 19,
2014), http://www.gud-knight.com/en/knight-sells-priority-review-voucher-to-gilead (sale
of the voucher amounting to $125 million).
55. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting the Survival Needs of World's Least Healthy
People: A Proposed Model for Global Health Governance, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 225, 226
(2007).
56. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 53, at 1531 ("On February 24, 2005, 162 leading
scientists, academic law professors, economists, NGOs, members of parliaments,
government officials and others wore the WHO Executive Board and CIPH to request that
they evaluate a proposal for a New Global Medical R&D Treaty."). Proposals for treaties
aiming to meet the health needs of developing countries have been framed more
ambitiously, as well. See, e.g., Gostin & Friedman, supra note 40 (proposing a "Framework
Convention on Global Health" that would aim to provide, among other things, universal
health coverage and increased channeling of financial resources to developing countries
for the purposes of sanitation and noncommunicable disease treatments).
57. See World Health Assembly, World Health Org., Consultative Expert Working
Group on Research and Development, Financing and Coordination, U.N. Doc. A65/24,
65th Sess. (Apr. 20, 2012) [hereinafter CEWG Report].
58. WHO CONST. art. 19.
59. See CEWG Report, supra note 58, at 17.
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B. The Proposals' Upshot: Continued Neglect of NTDs
As the foregoing demonstrates, there is a wealth of scholarship
devoted to remedying the scarcity of NTD R&D. Unfortunately,
however, there is a comparative dearth of examples of these proposals
being implemented, with PDPs being the main exception. They have
proliferated since the turn of the century60 and include such influential
global health institutions as the Medicines for Malaria Venture; the
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation; and the Drugs for
Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi).61 Of these, DNDi provides
perhaps the best example of the potential PDPs can have in developing
new treatments for NTDs, as it has helped produce four: one for Chagas
disease, two for leishmaniasis, and one for Human African
trypanosomiasis. 62 Unfortunately, however, PDPs represent at best a
piecemeal solution to the lack of NTD R&D, as they are too few and too
underfunded to provide a complete cure for the pharmaceutical
industry's inattention to these diseases. 63
Outside of the successes of PDPs, the picture remains bleak and
NTDs still very much neglected. Pull-mechanism proposals have
suffered either one of two fates: (1) not being implemented, as has been
the case with innovation prize schemes; 64 or (2) being implemented to
little effect. The latter has been the fate of priority review vouchers and
AMCs. Though a bill authorizing the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration to grant priority review vouchers to researchers who
developed an NTD treatment was passed into law in 2007,65 its effect on
inducing NTD R&D has been quite modest, with only one voucher being
60. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 12, at 11; ELIZABETH PONDER & MELINDA MOREE,
DEVELOPING NEW DRUGS & VACCINES FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES OF THE POOR: THE
PRODUCT DEVELOPER LANDSCAPE 16 (2012), http://www.bvgh.org/Portals/OfReports/
2012 03 developing-new.drugsand vaccinesfor.neglecteddiseases.pdf (identifying
twenty-six PDPs).
61. See Mueller-Langer, supra note 45, at 190.
62. See DNDI Treatments, DNDI, http://www.dndi.org/treatments (last visited Apr. 16,
2016). DNDi has also delivered two treatments for malaria, which, though not classified as
an NTD, afflicts a similar demographic: 88% of malaria cases and 90% of malaria deaths
occur in developing nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, an area to which many NTDs are
endemic. See Malaria, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en/ (last
visited Apr. 16, 2016).
63. See Morgan, supra note 42, at 100.
64. Various attempts have been made to pass "Medical Innovation Prize Fund" Acts
into U.S. law, the most recent of which was helmed by U.S. Senator Bernard Sanders, but
none of them have been successful. See Basheer, supra note 53, at 31 n.58.
65. See Hamming, supra note 51, at 394. The priority review voucher system for NTDs
is currently codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(n). See id. at 394 & n.25.
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granted to a developer of an NTD treatment so far.66 As for AMCs, only
one, for pneumococcal diseases, has ever been launched,67 and it serves
as poor evidence for the claim that AMCs will serve as a stimulant:
many of the vaccines that the program has delivered were already
available or in late stage development at the time of the program's
inception.68 Finally, reception to the notion of a binding international
R&D treaty has been tepid.69 Although the World Health Assembly
agreed in May 2012 to begin negotiating such a treaty, 70 no agreement
has been forthcoming.
Given the numerous proposals that have been advanced to resolve
the issue, this continuing inertia is puzzling. But a measure of clarity
may be provided by an examination of the incentives bearing on the
actors whose conduct these proposals seek to influence: governments of
developed states and pharmaceutical companies.
1. Developed-State Governments
Despite the recent explosion of financial assistance flowing from the
developed to the developing world, 71 which may suggest to some that the
global health system is remarkable for its altruistic character, an
element of self-interest still pervades the foreign policy choices
governments of states make with respect to global health. As David
Fidler observes, "states tend to be more interested in problems that
directly threaten their interests, require collective action in order to
minimize the threat, and involve limited, feasible interventions."72
Such tendencies serve to explain the adoption of the IHR. 73 As
revised in 2005, the IHR require WHO Member States to develop their
66. See PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHER, priorityreviewvoucher.org (last visited Apr. 19,
2016). In fairness, however, it should be noted that vouchers have been granted to
developers of treatments for malaria and tuberculosis, diseases that are not classified as
NTDs yet are most prevalent in locations and among demographics similar to those
affected by NTDs.
67. See DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, THE ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENT FOR
PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINES 6 (2013), http://www.gavi.orgfLibrary/Documents/GAVI-
documents/Evaluations/AMC-Process-and-Design-Evaluation-Full-Report.
68. See Basheer, supra note 53, at 53.
69. See Balasegaram et al., supra note 14, at 2.
70. See Kevin A. Klock, The Soft Law Alternative to the WHO's Treaty Powers, 44 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 821, 823 (2013).
71. Development assistance for health has witnessed an almost threefold increase
since the beginning of this century, "from $10.9 billion in 2000 to $30.6 billion in 2011."
SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 16.
72. Fidler, supra note 12, at 12.
73. See Harley Feldbaum & Joshua Michaud, Health Diplomacy and the Enduring
Relevance ofForeign Policy Interests, PLOS MED., Apr. 2010, at 1, 4.
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core capacities to detect and monitor diseases and to report outbreaks
that constitute public health risks and emergencies due to their
potential for cross-border transmission.7 4 This emphasis on the
collective responsibilities of states to alert the larger political
community to infectious disease threats "establish[ed] health security as
a global public good." 75 But given that developed countries have
generally not been the sources of infectious diseases that the IHR seek
to protect against,7 6 and given that the IHR do not obligate developed
states to provide any financial assistance to developing states
attempting to build their core capacities, 77 any benefits that the IHR
may secure accrue mostly to developed rather than to developing states.
As such, some experts have caustically described the IHR as "only an
extension of age-old power politics."78
Similarly, this entrenched practice for states to make foreign policy
choices with respect to health that directly advance or protect their
interests can be seen in the character of the diseases they typically turn
their attentions to. Generally, diseases that have demonstrated
pandemic potential such as SARS, MERS, and H1N1 influenza have
been subject to greater efforts to combat them.79 But perhaps the best
example of this tendency lies in the level of attention and resources
devoted to HIV/AIDS. The disease has truly a global reach, afflicting
approximately 37 million people worldwide.80 Consequently, it has
attracted the lion's share of political attention and financial assistance
from the developed world: Millennium Development Goal 6, adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly in 2000,81 expressly made combating
74. See NAM REPORT, supra note 13, at 24.
75. Id.
76. A notable exception is the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, which first arose in Mexico and
then quickly spread to the United States and Canada. See Katz & Fischer, supra note 26,
at 5-6.
77. See Empowered WHO, supra note 20, at 1906 (noting that all that the IHR contain
is "permissive language.. .requiring 'states to collaborate with each other, to the extent
possible') (emphasis in original).
78. Feldbaum & Michaud, supra note 74, at 4; see also Katz & Fischer, supra note 26,
at 9 ("[T]he underlying global health security paradigm [established by the IHR] can be
perceived . . . as an enormous obligation for developing nations assumed primarily to
protect the populations of developed nations .... ").
79. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 20. This tendency is of some vintage, as
the realization of the danger that cross-border cholera epidemics posed contributed to the
birth of international health law at the first International Sanitary Conference in 1851.
See David P. Fidler, The Future of the World Health Organization: What Role for
International Law?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1083 (1998).
80. See Global Summary of the AIDS Epidemic, WHO (July 21, 2015),
http://www.who.int/hiv/data/epi-corejuly2015.png?ua=l.
81. See G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. AJRES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
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HIV/AIDS a priority,8 2 and nearly 18 percent of development assistance
for health is devoted to efforts toward treating the disease. 83
Even examples of aid provision by developed states to developing
states that appear more evidently altruistic are shaded with a tinge of
self-interest. As Harley Feldbaum and Joshua Michaud observe,
developed states have in recent years used the provision of health aid as
a "soft power" means of advancing foreign policy interests.8 4 The U.S.
military is a prime example of this phenomenon. For instance, some
years ago the U.S. Navy launched the hospital ships Mercy and Comfort
to provide care to medically neglected populations around the world.
Similarly, during antiterrorist operations in the Horn of Africa,
Afghanistan, and Iraq, U.S. military personnel provided medical aid to
local citizens in an attempt to secure their support for the military's
efforts.85
In short, while the efforts and resources of developed states have
undeniably been instrumental in the progress made toward alleviating
the burdens of some public health threats to developing states, such as
the HIV/AIDS and malaria epidemics and maternal mortality, 86 their
efforts have not been made out of purely charitable inclinations. Rather,
they serve to advance various interests of these states, including
economic stability and security by averting the threat of communicable
diseases, and the political legitimacy and influence that comes from
providing aid to citizens of developing states.
Given these tendencies, the reasons for continued neglect of R&D
into NTDs become apparent. Thus far, NTDs have generally not
demonstrated themselves to be potentially as great a threat to the
security of developed states as other global pandemics of the twenty-
first century such as SARS, HIV/AIDS, or HINl influenza. Though
many NTDs, such as leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, and onchocerciasis,
have been known for years, they have remained largely confined to
developing states, 87 despite the ever-increasing mobility of populations
82. See id. at 1 19, 28; see also Millennium Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
83. SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 n.viii.
84. See Feldbaum & Michaud, supra note 74, at 2.
85. See id.; see also Fidler, supra note 12, at 6 ("U.S. aid agencies are placing greater
emphasis on global health as part of ... counterinsurgency strategies.").
86. The rates of both have decreased significantly since the adoption of the Millennium
Development Goals. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 17.
87. Chagas disease, for instance, claims the vast majority of its victims in Central and
South America. See Chagas Disease (American Trypanosomiasis), WHO,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs340/en/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). Visceral
leishmaniasis is found in a wider range of geographic areas, including South America,
Africa, and Southeast Asia, but it is virtually unknown in the United States and Europe.
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brought about by globalization. Even dengue, a global epidemic
estimated to have infected up to 390 million people worldwide,8 8 has
been projected by experts to pose virtually no risk of spreading to and
reaching epidemic levels in developed states in either the Americas or
the European Union.8 9 Moreover, on the few occasions that it has spread
to such states,90 supportive treatment has generally sufficed to contain
it,91 obviating the need for the development of any vaccine or
therapeutic treatment. Thus, the direct and observable threat to the
economic interests or security of developed states that generally spurs
them to commit resources to combat public health problems outside
their own borders is largely absent in the case of NTDs.
Moreover, while states have recently shown a greater willingness to
integrate health aid into their foreign policy choices as a means of "soft
power," the foregoing examples of such aid constitute aid of a different
kind than investment in R&D. R&D is a costly, lengthy endeavor,9 2 with
the production of a new treatment or vaccine at the end of a process not
guaranteed; by contrast, the "soft power" health interventions discussed
here were essentially one-off transactions involving the delivery of
preexisting medical tools and services. Additionally, international
health aid still generally flows to "high-visibility events. . . such as the
See Status of Endemicity of Visceral Leishmaniasis, Worldwide, 2012, WHO,
http://gamapserver.who.int/mapLibrary/Files/Maps/Leishmaniasis VL_2013.png?ua=1
(last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 99% of people infected with onchocerciasis live in one of 31
African countries. See Onchocerciasis, WHO, http://www.who.int/onchocerciasis/en/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2016).
88. Samir Bhatt et al., The Global Distribution and Burden of Dengue, 496 NATURE
504, 504 (2013). This estimate includes patients from the Americas, Africa, Asia, and
Oceania, demonstrating the wide reach of the disease. Id. at 505.
89. See id. at 506 fig.2(b).
90. For instance, Hawaii recently suffered a rather minor dengue outbreak (246 cases)
that appears to have come under control, with almost all patients being reported as no
longer infectious. See Dengue Fever-Hawaii Island Outbreak, HAwAII DEP'T HEALTH,
http://health.hawaii.gov/docd/dengue-outbreak-2015/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2016). Similarly,
Europe has largely been immune. See EUR. CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL,
ANNUAL EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REPORT: EMERGING AND VECTOR-BORNE DISEASES 30 (2014),
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/emerging-vector-borne-diseases-annual-
epidemiological-report-2014.pdf [hereinafter DENGUE REPORT]. Though 15 of 31 countries
from the European Union and the European Economic Area reported cases of dengue in
2012, the overall incidence in the bloc's population was 0.26 infections for every 100,000
persons. See id.
91. See DENGUE REPORT, supra note 90, at 33 (reporting that in the 2012-2013 dengue
outbreak in the Portuguese Madeira Islands, which had over 2,000 reported cases, "[n]o
severe clinical form or death was reported.").
92. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2007)
(stating that the drug development process can take up to fifteen years).
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Asian tsunami" and "diseases that capture the public's imagination."93
NTDs, however, have largely been pushed out of the public eye by more
noticeable health threats, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis,
the subjects of Millennium Development Goal 6.94 Therefore, NTDs
provide little possibility of conferring the positive publicity (and the
consequent political legitimacy) on developed states that would make
enactment of policies stimulating NTD R&D worthwhile.
Viewed against this backdrop, any significant contribution of
resources by developed states to resolving the issue of lack of R&D into
NTDs would essentially be charity. In fact, a cursory glance at the
source of the financial support for the institutions most involved with
what little NTD R&D there is, PDPs,95 confirms this: the majority of
funding for PDPs comes from philanthropic institutions such as the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation 96 and the Wellcome Trust.97 But as
states typically give with some expectation of receiving some benefit in
return, proposals such as AMCs, innovation prize schemes, or a global
treaty mandating R&D into infectious diseases of poverty such as NTDs
are unlikely to ever gain much traction.98
The literature that grapples with stimulating R&D into NTDs,
however, generally does not account for these factors. Instead, it
typically advances normative arguments about why such efforts are
93. Gostin, supra note 56, at 225.
94. See Nick Feasey et al., Neglected Tropical Diseases, 93 BRIT. MED. BuLL. 179, 180
(2010).
95. See Towse et al., supra note 49, at 22 (noting that PDPs were involved in 85% of
the projects for development of products for neglected diseases).
96. MARY MORAN ET AL., NEGLECTED DISEASE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: A FIVE
YEAR REVIEW 99 (2012), http://www.pohcycures.org/downloads/GF2012_Report.pdf. It
should be noted, however, that this figure includes R&D into HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis, diseases which still are neglected relative to the number of individuals they
infect but which are not classified as NTDs by the WHO. Thus, even much of the
philanthropic funding for infectious disease R&D is not funneled toward NTDs. In fact,
the G-Finder Report indicated that HIV/AIDs received 33.8% of all infectious disease R&D
funding (whether from the public sector or philanthropic institutions), malaria 18.4%, and
tuberculosis 17.3%, with only a pittance left over for NTDs such as trachoma. See id. at
10.
97. See id. at 84 (noting that the Gates Foundation and the Wellcome Trust donated
95.1% of all philanthropic funding for NTD R&D in 2011).
98. See Kock supra note 71, at 842 ("[Tjreaties work well when all parties receive some
incremental benefit as a result of their legal obligations to each other", but in the case of
an R&D treaty for NTDs, "only [developing countries] receive any benefit ... [making it]
unclear why industrialized countries would voluntarily incur the sovereignty costs
involved" with such a treaty). Additionally, such a maneuver would represent a radical
departure from the WHO's traditional reluctance to negotiate legally binding agreements:
since its inception in 1948, it has negotiated only three, the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, the "Nomenclature Regulations," and the IHR. See id. at 827-829.
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needed, emphasizing that it is an affront to justice for a wide swath of
humanity to languish in illness simply because they are too poor to pay
for necessary treatments. 99 While there is merit to this argument, 10 the
failure, shared by other proposals of reform of global governance, to
provide any persuasive explanation as to why states would adopt these
proposals 1o ' risks the perpetuation of the current state of affairs: a
suboptimal level of investment by developed states in R&D for NTDs.
2. Pharmaceutical Companies
The reluctance of pharmaceutical companies to undertake NTD
R&D in the manner envisioned by proposals may be explained largely
as a byproduct of the general disinclination of states to incorporate push
and pull mechanisms into their legal regimes. After all, most push and
pull mechanisms envision some outlay of government resources, yet
governments have exhibited little enthusiasm for this manner of
resource allocation. Moreover, given past experience, pharmaceutical
companies would have reason to suspect the credibility of any ex ante
government agreement to purchase NTD treatments after their
development. On one previous occasion, for instance, the U.S.
government failed to purchase the promised amount of seasonal flu
vaccines it called for from pharmaceutical companies, 10 2 and any
number of political circumstances may arise in the interim period
between any purchase agreement and a vaccine or treatment's
development that may prevent the necessary funds from
materializing. 103 When this is added to the fact that access to already
developed vaccines and treatments is generally poor in developing
99. See, e.g., Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing
World: Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 1,
38 (arguing that the "developed world has a duty to ... countries suffering public health
problems", such as lack of treatments for NTDs); CEWG REPORT, supra note 58, at 30
("While we have the technical capacity to provide access to lifesaving medicines, vaccines
or other interventions, which are indeed widely available in the developed world, millions
of people, including children, suffer and die in developing countries because such means
are not available and accessible there. Governments around the world have recognized the
force of this moral argument, but there is still a large gap between rhetoric and action."'
(quoting The Global Health Innovation Quotient Prize: A Milestone-Based Prize To
Stimulate R&D For Point-Of-Care Fever Diagnostics, BIO VENTURES FOR GLOBAL HEALTH
(2011), http://www.who.intlphi/news/cewg_2Ollen/index.html)).
100. As Lawrence Gostin and Eric Friedman have written, the present system, in which
"the happenstance of one's birth [is] still the greatest determinant of health" is manifestly
unjust. See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 40, at 9.
101. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 17.
102. See DALBERG GLOBAL DEV. ADVISORS, supra note 68, at 68.
103. See id.
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countries, 104 thereby making it uncertain that the intended beneficiaries
of the products of NTD R&D would be able to secure them, the reasons
underpinning the pharmaceutical industry's continuing inertia in the
area of NTD R&D seem clear. Whether Ebola will change this remains
to be seen.
III. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT REFORM PROPOSALS THAT EMERGED
FROM THE CRISIS
As one group of commentators has written, "[plerhaps more than
any disease outbreak before it, Ebola is being widely used as a starting
point for assessing the state of the global health architecture and
crafting new proposals."'10 5 Below I examine reports issued by three
expert panels formed in response to the Ebola crisis: the Ebola Interim
Assessment Panel (EIAP), formed at the behest of the WHO; one formed
in a joint effort between the Harvard Global Health Institute and the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM); and one
commissioned by the U.S. National Academy of Medicine (NAM).
A. EIAP Report
As the EIAP aptly puts it, "the Ebola outbreak demonstrated that
research and development for neglected diseases remains
inadequate."'1 6 However, the EIAP does not provide much further
content that would help explain how an adequate level of R&D could be
reached. Instead, it issues the rather vague recommendation that a
"platform for the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines
must be put in place and developed to such an extent that, when there
is an outbreak, much of the preparatory . . . work will have been
completed and it will then be possible to move quickly to production and
deployment." 10 7 Its emphasis on "outbreak" R&D does not sound a
hopeful note for those hoping for increased NTD R&D after Ebola. As
mentioned, outbreaks of NTDs have not yet demonstrated much ability
to spread to developed states, where the vast majority of R&D capacity
is located. Thus, while the EIAP writes that it believed Ebola outbreak
104. Though access is improving, delivery of treatments still remains a pressing issue.
For instance, almost 40% of those in Africa infected with HIV are without access to life-
saving antiretrovirals, and even simpler health interventions such as insecticide-treated
mosquito nets are unavailable to 51% of the African population at risk of contracting
malaria. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 18.
105. Id. at 31.
106. EIAP REPORT, supra note 13, at 21.
107. Id.
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was "a defining moment for the health of the global community[,]' ' 1 8 its
report does not provide any concrete proposals on how the health of the
"bottom billion"10 9 of that community could be better secured through
R&D in the aftermath of the Ebola crisis.
B. Harvard-LSHTM Report
The Harvard-LSHTM report offers a holistic assessment of the
lessons to be learned from the Ebola epidemic, recommending ten
measures to take before the next global pandemic arises. 110 Of these ten,
one in particular is relevant for present purposes: its recommendation to
"[e]stablish a global facility to finance, accelerate, and prioritise
research and development." '1 11 According to the report, the "facility
would support manufacturing, research, and development for drugs,
vaccines, [and] diagnostics . . .where the commercial market does not
appropriate incentives,' 112 and would "offer the advantage of enabling
coordination between different research funders through a common
framework, strengthening networks between researchers, establishing
processes for priority setting, and reducing transaction costs for both
grantees and smaller donors."113
This recommendation echoes prior calls for the establishment of a
global health fund administered to finance R&D into infectious diseases
of poverty such as NTDs.114 However, like them, it is open to the
criticism that it lacks the detail necessary for its implementation.11 5 For
instance, the report does not explicitly state where funding for this
facility would come from. However, if it is expected (or hoped) to come
from developed states, this recommendation suffers from the same flaws
as previous proposals of ways to stimulate R&D into infectious diseases
of poverty: it contains no explanation of why Ebola would reverse the
108. Id. at 5.
109. See Feasey et al., supra note 95, at 180.
110. See HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-2.
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., John-Arne Rottingen et al., Securing the Public Good of Health Research
and Development for Developing Countries, 90 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 398, 399 (2012)
(advocating for the CEWG's recommendation of an establishment of a pooled fund for
subsidizing NTD R&D); see also Peter J. Hotez et al., A Global Fund to Fight Neglected
Tropical Diseases: Is the G8 Hokkaido Toyako 2008 Summit Ready?, 2 PLOS NEGLECTED
TROPICAL DISEASES 1 (2008) ('IT]here are several reasons why a Global Fund- type
mechanism would satisfy an urgent need to support NTD control and elimination.").
115. As David Fidler has written, "[b]older plans to craft a new architecture for global
health governance tend to lack specifics that would give these concepts concrete form."
Fidler, supra note 12, at 16.
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general trend of states offering only pittances to finance such R&D,
merely stating that its recommendation is "feasible."' 1 6 Moreover, given
the dizzying array of entities already populating the global health
landscape,11 7 it is questionable whether the facility envisioned by the
Harvard-LSHTM panel would be able to provide the coordination
necessary for effective R&D into infectious diseases.
Additionally, the report never explains why pharmaceutical
companies and other health technology developers would be motivated
to compete for whatever resources that the facility may offer them,
rather than simply persist in the business practices that have currently
made them one of the most profitable industries in the world.1' 8 Finally,
while the report claims that there is a growing consensus that some sort
of pooled international funding mechanism is needed, it cites for support
proposals cut from the same cloth as those that have failed to be
implemented before, 119 undermining the notion that any such consensus
truly exists.
C. U.S. NAM Report
Similar to the Harvard-LSHTM report, the NAM report offers a host
of recommendations on measures that should be taken so as to
strengthen global health governance in the future. In its report, the
NAM stresses the need for a "more robust R&D strategy," given the
ever-growing (and ominous) specter of infectious disease outbreaks 2 0
that was demonstrated so painfully by the Ebola crisis. As the
centerpiece of its strategy, it recommends that the WHO establish a
"Pandemic Product Development Committee" (PPDC).121 The PPDC,
while developed by the WHO, would function independently of it122 and
would operate during both interim periods between outbreaks and the
116. See HARvARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 1.
117. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 15 ("The explosion of actors, institutions, initiatives,
and funding has created an environment characterized by political competition, regime
fragmentation, lack of evidence-based priority setting, wasted money .... and normative
incoherence.").
118. For instance, the ten largest pharmaceutical companies, all of which are
headquartered either in the European Union or United States, can expect annual profit
margins of approximately 30%. See Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 41.
119. See Balasegaram, supra note 14, at 3. See generally REVIEW ON ANTIMICROBIAL
RESISTANCE, supra note 5 (proposing a $2 billion "innovation fund" for financing new
antibiotics to combat the rise of antimicrobial resistance and a "designated global body"
with buy-in from states to purchase sales rights for the new antibiotics).
120. See NAM REPORT, supra note 13, at 69.
121. See id. at 70.
122. See id.
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outbreaks themselves. During the interim periods, when no pressing
emergency is at hand, the PPDC would coordinate efforts by a variety of
global health actors to develop and manufacture treatments and
products for diseases with pandemic or epidemic potential. 123 And
during the midst of an outbreak, the PPDC would draft an "emergency
preparedness plan" coordinating the efforts of all actors willing to
contribute to the mitigation of an outbreak. 124 To fund its efforts, the
NAM proposes that the WHO negotiate a $1 billion annual commitment
from global R&D stakeholders by the end of 2016.125 Potential sources of
funding, the NAM notes, were many and included direct contributions
from national governments, from R&D budgets devoted to national
security, and from philanthropic institutions concerned with improving
global health. 126
The NAM's proposal of a facility to finance the development of
infectious disease treatments and products roughly mirrors the EIAP
and Harvard-LSHTM reports' proposals for a similar platform, and so
suffers from some of the same defects. For instance, though it
emphasizes the economic sensibility of investing in such a product
development facility, noting that the World Bank has estimated that
global pandemics in the twenty-first century could cost more than $6
trillion,127 it fails to provide any explanation why the Ebola epidemic
would spur the global health community to take prophylactic action.
Indeed, such a response would be a radical departure from the general
trend of health interventions by the global health community. As David
Fidler has noted, global health governance responses to public health
threats such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, HIN1 influenza, and other infectious
diseases have typically been retroactive rather than proactive. 128 As
these diseases, particularly influenza, posed an apparently greater
danger to the global community than does Ebola, 129 Ebola seems
unlikely to serve as a catalyst for a R&D reform as revolutionary as that
proposed by the NAM.
Moreover, even were the PPDC established, a few elements in its
design make it somewhat doubtful that it could be effective as the NAM
suggests. For instance, while the NAM proposes that the PPDC operate
independently of the WHO, it is not entirely clear how this could be the
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 73.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 18.
128. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 15.
129. See David P. Fidler, The Ebola Outbreak and the Future of Global Health Security,
385 LANCET 1888, 1889 (2015).
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case, given that NAM envisions the WHO establishing the PPDC.
Additionally, the manner in which the PPDC is proposed to be financed
would likely not preserve its independent operation, a concern
demonstrated by the WHO's own funding experience. The WHO's
budget has decreased for years, and the majority of the funding that it
does receive from is earmarked for specific purposes, 13 0 undermining its
ability to further what prerogatives it, rather than its donors, deems
most necessary. In light of this evidence, it seems questionable whether
the PPDC could truly function as an entity not beholden to its donors.
In addition, it is not at all apparent that the WHO could negotiate
the funding necessary for the PPDC's establishment, given that its
widely criticized performance in the Ebola debacle has brought its
credibility to an all-time low. 13 1 And the vast challenges of coordination
that would face the facility proposed by the Harvard-LSHTM panel
would also face the PPDC. But more importantly, since NTD R&D has
never figured highly in the priorities of developed states, and the PPDC
would represent a radical departure from the past pattern of responses
to infectious disease pandemics, its establishment is improbable.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: WILL EBOLA SERVE TO MAKE SUPPORT FOR
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT REFORM Go VIRAL?
As these reports indicate, the devastation that Ebola caused in West
Africa has given rise to the notion that some change must occur,
including in the arena of R&D into infectious diseases of poverty, where
pharmaceutical companies and states have been virtual noncontestants
for years. But due to the particular facts of the Ebola outbreak, such an
outcome seems unlikely. As mentioned above, the most recent Ebola
outbreak was preceded by more than two dozen others, none of which
ever assumed the present's breathtaking scale. Yet there, too, there was
no approved treatment or vaccine for Ebola, suggesting that the failures
of global health governance that contributed most to the disastrous
consequences in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia had little to do with
R&D.132 This, indeed, is indicated by the assessments of the three
panels and other experts evaluating the Ebola crisis. In them, two
130. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 23.
131. See Future of Global Health Security, supra note 130, at 1889.
132. In fact, the R&D portion of the response to Ebola appears to be one of the few areas
in which the response is deemed to have been somewhat successful. See EIAP REPORT,
supra note 13, at 21 (commending WHO for its efforts in fast-tracking vaccine candidate
trials); see also HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 ("In several instances,
WHO proved its capacity to lead, convene, coordinate, and establish norms among a broad
range of public and private actors on research and development ... ").
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factors explaining the outbreak's extent are repeatedly emphasized:
first, the failure of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia to develop their
core capacities as mandated by the IHR, a failure that allowed Ebola to
spread undetected and unimpeded; 133 and second, the failure of the
global health community to promptly provide support for the three
countries once the dire nature of the outbreak became known.
13 4
The failure of states to comply with the IHR's demand that states
develop their capabilities to detect, control, and report infectious
diseases that threaten to spread beyond their borders has been widely
documented in the aftermath of the Ebola epidemic. The EIAP report,
for instance, lamented the great number of states that had not achieved
the core capacities mandated by the IHR, 135 and as Dr. Charles Clift
writes, "[t]he failure to detect and report the outbreak in Guinea early
enough and the fact that the initial response, once it was reported, was
not robust were principal reasons why the outbreak spread to Liberia
and Sierra Leone and the capital cities in all three countries."136 Given
this consensus, one may expect any tangible reform to emerge from the
Ebola epidemic to be tailored more toward support for capacity-building
than infectious disease R&D. Indeed, some evidence already exists that
suggests that this may be the case: those concrete financial
commitments that have emerged to date (not including those directly
focused on containing the outbreak) have focused on capacity-building
rather than R&D. 137
Additionally, the "epidemic of legal non-compliance" with the IHR
during the Ebola epidemic included numerous instances of states
imposing quarantines and restrictions on the delivery of vital aid
(whether that aid took the form of health personnel or medical
equipment) to Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, without scientific
justification as required by the Regulations. 138 This taxed the already
133. The EIAP, for instance, devoted wholly a third of its report to detailing the ways in
which the IHR were violated and how they should be amended so as to avoid this in the
future. See EIAP REPORT, supra note 13, at 10-14.
134. See id. at 5 ("[Slignificant and unjustifiable delays occurred. ); see also
HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 4 ('[T]he operational response commenced
slowly .... "); NAM REPORT, supra note 13, at 9 ("[Alfter the outbreak was recognized, the
international response was slow and uncoordinated.").
135. By November 2014, 81 states were not in compliance, while 48 did not inform WHO
of their compliance status. See EIAP REPORT, supra note 13, at 10.
136. Charles Clift, Is Yet Another Ebola Report a Symptom of the Problem or the
Solution?, CHATHAM HOUSE (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/
comment/yet-another-ebola-report-symptom-problem-or-solution.
137. For instance, the United States has pledged $1 billion to support the building of
core capacities in 30 developing states, including those most affected by the Ebola
outbreak. See HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 5.
138. See International Health Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 43, para. 2.
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weak health systems of the affected countries, allowing Ebola to spread
mostly unimpeded. Yet had states been more willing to keep their
channels of trade open and the global community more willing to
intervene sooner, the situation likely would have been far less dire, 139 as
Ebola's method of transmission (through direct contact with bodily
fluids) makes it easy to contain relative to other infectious diseases even
without any therapeutic treatments.140 Thus, though the lack of an
approved treatment or vaccine for Ebola certainly increased the burden
the disease imposed, it is difficult to say that this lack was the most
noteworthy failure that the epidemic uncovered. As such, the crisis
seems unlikely to be a watershed event in global health governance with
respect to NTD R&D.
Moreover, though the scale of the Ebola epidemic was devastating,
it failed to reach the far more dire dimensions that some experts
predicted that it could.' 4 ' Perversely, then, its containment may perhaps
be viewed by developed states as confirmation that the current model of
"limited, feasible interventions" 42 suffices to address the issue of
infectious diseases of poverty. But even if it is not so viewed, the Ebola
epidemic's toll pales in comparison to the number of victims claimed
yearly by other infectious diseases such as malaria, 143 tuberculosis, 144
and dengue. As none of these diseases have spurred any meaningful
change to the current health R&D framework, it seems somewhat
doubtful that the Ebola epidemic will have a contrary effect.
Even the manner in which the highly effective vaccine, Merck's
rVSV-ZEBOV, came about suggests that no momentum toward
increased NTD R&D predated the Ebola outbreak, momentum that the
outbreak could have augmented. Instead, rVSV-ZEBOV's development
is rather more an example of a fortunate convergence of developed-state
research efforts and developing-state need. The discovery of rVSV-
ZEBOV's effectiveness against Ebola arose not from concern for the
139. See HARVARD-LSHTM REPORT, supra note 13, at 4 ("[Pjublic ... restrictions on
trade and travel further harmed an already suffering region and hindered control
efforts.").
140. See Annette Rid & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Why Should High-Income Countries Help
Combat Ebola?, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1297, 1297 (2014).
141. For instance, at one point during the outbreak the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
projected that the number of cases could potentially reach 550,000. See Roache et al.,
supra note 3, at 3.
142. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 12.
143. The most recent WHO figures estimate that 438,000 people died from malaria in
2015. See Malaria, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs094/en / (last
visited Apr. 19, 2016).
144. The WHO estimates that in 2014, 1.4 million children died from tuberculosis. See
Tuberculosis, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fsl04/en/ (last visited Apr.
19, 2016).
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safety of the African populations most at risk of contracting the disease,
but rather out of a concern by researchers in developed states that the
virus could be used as a bioterrorism agent against North American
populations. 145
Moreover, contemporary global crises and trends in global health
make it unlikely that any appreciable increase in NTD R&D will come
about as a result of the Ebola outbreak. Years ago, David Fidler
predicted that political attention to global health would dwindle due to
the rise of other high-profile crises requiring collective action, such as
global terrorism and climate change. 146 With the ever-expanding
influence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and the recent
adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change, 147 such an
assessment seems to have been accurate. Additionally, the rising
incidence of noncommunicable diseases such as cancer and heart
disease 148 provides one more reason to think that the Ebola epidemic
will not spark any appreciably greater R&D into NTDs. Pharmaceutical
R&D has tracked the rise in noncommunicable diseases,149 as has WHO
priority-setting. 150 Greater commitment to NTD R&D, then, would
represent a commitment to a problem that some in the global health
community view as having been eclipsed in importance by other
pressing issues. And while Ebola has brought greater attention to the
problem of infectious diseases, it is likely that this attention will diffuse
in time, as has been the case with past, more dangerous, pandemics.' 5'
In short, the rapid spread of the Ebola epidemic was more
attributable to factors other than a lack of R&D; it was of a relatively
small size in comparison to other infectious disease epidemics that have
failed to stimulate a greater commitment to NTD R&D; developed states
continue to invest in infectious disease R&D only insofar as it protects
their security priorities; the rise of high-profile issues such as global
terrorism and climate change has commandeered high-level political
attention; and the shift in the global disease burden has shifted to
145. See Rosenberg, supra note 36.
146. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 19.
147. See Robinson Meyer, Is Hope Possible After the Paris Agreement, ATLANTIC (Dec.
12, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/can-we-hope-after-the-paris-
agreement/420174.
148. See SCHAFERHOFF ET AL., supra note 14, at 18.
149. See Stephens & Leufkens, supra note 43, at 6 (pointing out that 85% of all medical
conditions being investigated by pharmaceutical companies are noncommunicable
conditions).
150. See Fidler, supra note 130, at 1888 (arguing that the WHO has downgraded the
importance of the public health threat posed by infectious diseases and chosen instead to
focus its recent efforts on addressing noncommunicable diseases).
151. See id. at 1889.
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noncommunicable conditions from infectious diseases. For these
reasons, R&D into NTDs will likely continue to progress at minimal
levels, notwithstanding the awful damage that Ebola demonstrated that
such infectious diseases can inflict.
CONCLUSION
David Quammen best summarized the lesson to be drawn from the
Ebola outbreak:
[W]hat we should recognize, what we should remember,
is that the events in West Africa . . . tell us not just
about the ugly facts of Ebola's transmissibility and
lethality; they tell us also about the ugly facts of poverty,
inadequate health care, political dysfunction ... and of
neglectful disregard of those circumstances over time by
the international community. 152
They do indeed. Ebola and similar diseases, such as NTDs, have not
suddenly ambushed a world previously unaware of their existence. They
have remained neglected for years because they afflict remote and
impoverished populations in locations far afield from where the bulk of
the world's R&D capacity resides. Because there is little political
incentive for developed states to make up for this shortfall, they
continue to exact a heavy human toll. The current spread of the Zika
virus through the Caribbean and Central and South America is simply
the most recent example of this phenomenon, as the virus was first
identified in Uganda in 1947, yet its true effects remain largely a
mystery to scientists. 153
Ebola was a disaster that demonstrated the many weaknesses of
global health governance: the WHO's abdication of its role as the
guardian of global health, the failure of the community of states to fulfill
its obligations under international health law, and the persistent
neglect of diseases that disproportionately affect impoverished
152. See QUAMMEN, supra note 4, at 110.
153. See Donald G. McNeil et al., Short Answers to Hard Questions About Zika Virus,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytines.com/interactive/2016/healthwhat-is-zika-virus.html (last
updated Feb. 24, 2016). Due to the virus' relatively mild symptoms and the fact that its
role, if any, in causing microcephaly (abnormally small heads and brain damage) in the
infants of infected pregnant women is unclear, the lack of focus on Zika may be more
understandable than the lack of attention to NTDs. See id. However, perhaps so as to
avoid a repeat of the Ebola debacle, the WHO has declared the Zika outbreak a public
health emergency of international concern. See id.
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populations. But as this Note has attempted to show, this last
phenomenon is unlikely to change appreciably in response to the Ebola
epidemic. Other epidemics, some more deadly than Ebola, have come
and gone without inducing a greater level of NTD R&D, and due to the
particular circumstances of the Ebola epidemic, there is little reason to
believe that it will provoke a different response.
Nonetheless, the sheer amount of attention that Ebola has received,
evident in the number of panels formed to consider it and the immense
outpouring of resources from the global community to contain the
disease, allows for some measure of hope. Financial commitments to aid
in the development of core capacities required by the IHR have quickly
materialized in the wake of the epidemic. With external support,
developing states may be able to construct public health systems better
capable of responding to infectious disease threats such as Ebola and
NTDs like it, hopefully protecting against "the creation of a permanent
global health underclass of poor and marginalized people."'154 But as
with the accuracy of this Note's prediction on the future of infectious
disease R&D, this remains to be seen.
154. See Gostin & Friedman, supra note 40, at 19.
